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The power of an owner of personal property to follow that
property in the hands of a wrongdoer And recover the same in
specie is explained by the history of replevin. Doctrines of the
tortious confusion of goods simply amplify the same general
theme. Where the peculiar nature of the chattel has called for
restoration of the exact thing in order to do complete justice, the
power has, for two and a half centuries at least, been successfully
asserted in equity.1 And if the chattel has been exchanged for
another commodity which can be identified while in the wrong-
doer's possession the reclamation of the substituted form of the
original property has long been vindicated at law 2 and in equity1
The sanction of peaceful self-help in such a case won the approval
of Lord Ellenborough on the ground that, as long as the sub-
stitute remained in the wrongdoer's possession, the wronged
party "never ceased to be the lawful proprietor." ' Properly to
redress the owner's injury, equity erects a constructive trust of
the substitute, and so long as the substitute is not dissipated or
transferred to a bona fide purchaser but one limitation restrains
the exercise of the owner's power-the necessity of identifica-
tion.5 *
When the substitute took the form of money, the courts in the
earlier cases were of opinion that equity could not follow the
money and decree restitution as money "has no earmark." 0 This
attitude Lord Ellenborough took care to correct when he said,
.. .the dictum that money has no earmark must be under-
' Pusey v. Pusey, 1 Vern. 273 (1684); Duke of Somerset v. Cookson,
3 P. Wms. 390 (1735). •
2 The power of following the proceeds of the conversion process is, of
course, available to the owner when the person in possession has, in an
authorized manner, disposed of the chattel and the proceeds have been
retained in his estate until death or bankruptcy. Burdett v. Willett, 2
Vern. 638 (1708) (sale by factor on credit; payment decreed to principal) ;
Garratt v. Cullum, Buller N.P. 42 (1709) (same); Whitecomb v. Jacob,
1 Salk. 160 (1711) (proceeds of sale by factor invested in goods; goods
held property of principal); Scott v. Surman, Willes 400 (1742) (sale by
factor; payment in notes of buyer; notes and bounty money held-property
of principal).
3 Ryall v. Ryall, 1 Atk. 59 (1739).
Taylor v. Plumer, 3 M. & S. 562 (1815).
rToaY, EQurrY JURISPRUDENCE (1st ed. 1836) §§ 1258-1259.
, \hitcomb v. Jacob, supra note 2; Ryall v. Rolle, 1 Atk. 194 (1749).
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stood in the same way; i.e., as predicated only of an undivided
and undistinguishable mass of current money. But money in a
bag, or otherwise kept apart from other money . .. is so far
earmarked as to fall within the rule on this subject." The more
ancient view was thus succeeded by the Ellenborough rule that
identification would fail only when the money had been mingled
with other money, but as the wronged person was seldom able
to point out specifically the exact coins or bills which represented
the proceeds of his goods, and since the combined fund could
scarcely be regarded as the product of these proceeds, iden-
tification was still often impossible. Fortunately for defrauded
owners of personalty and cestuis que trust a more liberal inter-
pretation of "identification" has come to prevail and by the
adoption of certain tracing methods a beneficiary is accorded
an interest in the commingled fund.
The doctrine of tracing misappropriated property into its
product has found its greatest utility in situations where the
wrongdoer is a trustee or occupies some other fiduciary relation
to the legal or equitable owner of the property., The ijvestment
by an executor of estate moneys in land,8 the purchase of in-
surance by a fraudulent partner with partnership fundso the
acquisition of securities by the use of trust assets, 0 come readily
to mind. In such situations if the proceeds of the disposition of
trust property are deposited in a separate account in a bank to
the credit of the defaulting trustee, the equivalent of Lord Ellen-
borough's money kept apart from other money is found and no
further question of identification is raised. , Where the trust
funds are deposited to the credit of the trustee's personal ac-
count in which there is already a balance, the courts have not,
for many decades, felt that the means of ascertainment failed
as a simple result of such commingling.1 Identification succeeds
as long as it is possible to trace such funds into the bank and find
7Some of the older American cases denied the owner's claim to follow.
the proceeds in cases where his chattel was converted by a criminal act.
Campbell v. Drake, 4 Ired. Eq. 94 (N. C. 1844); Pascoag Bank v. Hunt,
3 Edw. Ch. 615 (N. Y. 1842); Hart v. Dogge, 27 Neb. 256 (1889). The
modern view is almost uniformly otherwise. See review of cases in Preston
v. Moore, 133 Tenn. 247, 180 S. W. 320 (1915). See Comment (1928) 37
YALm L. J. 654.
8 Ryall v. Ryall, supra note 3; McMillan v. McMillan, 218 Ala. 559, 119
So. 676 (1929).
9 Shaler v. Trowbridge, 28 N. J. Eq. 595 (1877) ; Mass. Bonding & Ins.
Co. v. Josselyn, 224 Mich. 159, 194 N. W. 548 (1923).
'0 Taylor v. Plumer, supra note 4; Frith v. Cartland, 2 H. & M. 417
(1865); In re Oatway, [1903] 2 Ch. D. 356; Glidden v. Gutelius, 96 Fla.
834, 119 So. 140 (1929).
"But cf. Portland Steamboat Co. v. Locke, 73 Mle. 370 (1882) ; cf. Bank
of Commerce v. Russell, 2 Dill. 215 (D. Mo. 1873).
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that the tr ;tee's credit balance consists in part of the credit
given for tb _z= 2
But whe:" from the commingled account, the defaulting "trus-
tee" 13 mak'?z withdrawals, more difficult problems of identifica-
tion begin to arise., To which component of the account should
such depletions be attributed? How may it be determined
whether or not any balance of credit remaining in the account
can be ascribed to the trust funds? The rule of convenience, in-
dicated by the expression "first in, first out," which was adopted
for other purposes in Clayton's Case,1 was applied by the court
in Pennell v. Deffell.1" Such a rule presumes that withdrawals
from an account are made in the same order that funds are de-
posited; accordingly the problem of identification is settled by a
determination of the condition of the account at the time trust
funds were deposited and an examination of withdrawals."? Al-
though this method was subsequently followed18 it was finally
rejected by the Court of Appeal in Knatchbull v. Hallett, 9 which
has become the classic upon this branch of the subject. In effect,
that case held that withdrawals by the trusteb for his private
purposes were to be ascribed to that part of the combined credit
arising from the deposit of his own funds.20 It is notable that
12Thus in Pennell v. Deffell, 4 De G. M. & G. 372 (1853), the contention
that such a blending of funds rendered the trust funds unidentifiable was
rejected, and the court proceeded to award a distinctive share in the aug-
mented account to the cestuis, despite the argument of the insolvent trus-
tee's creditors that they (the cestuis) should come in as general creditors.
Cf. Ex parte Coke, 4 Ch. D. 123 (1876).
"3The word "trustee" is used in this connection in a broad sense to In-
dicate the fiduciary who misappropriates or the converter who is made a
constructive trustee. "Trust" and "cestui" are likewise given broad
meanings.
14 The observations herein made in regard to tracing may be applied
equally well, of course, to cases of misappropriation and sale of property,
and to cases where a trustee is rightfully in possession of trust estate cash.
15 Devaynes v. Noble, 1 Mier. 528, 584 (1815).
"6 Supra note 12.
17 Thus, if the trustee's personal account carries a balance of £500, and
he then deposits therein £500 of trust funds, followed by a withdrawal of
£500, the balance of £500 remaining will be attributed to the trust funds.
None of the balance, under this rule, would be ascribed to the trust funds
if the latter had been deposited prior to the trustee's deposit of his own
funds.
28 Brown v. Adams, 4 Ch. D. 764 (1869).
2913 Ch. D. 696 (1880).
20 It is t-, be noted that the sums withdrawn in this case had been spent
and were not capable of being traced. Courts of equity had previously ap-
plied a like rule in variant fact situations. Pinkett v. Wright, 2 Hare 120
(1842); Frith v. Cartland, 2 H. & M. 417 (1865). But upon the trial
of 'his case Justice Fry had considered himself bound by the rule in Pen-
n. 1 v. Deffell, supra note 12, although he had no hesitation in expressing
his disapproval of it. 13 Ch. D. at 699. The Court of Appeal considered that
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in the opinions of both Jessell, M. R.,21 and Baggallay, L. J.,
emphasis was placed upon a presumption of the trustee's honesty
in withdrawing funds for his own use. The latter even expressed
the opinion that, if the balance left in the account were insuffi-
cient to cover the amount of the trust funds, the presumption of
honesty would necessarily be rebutted and the mechanics of
"first in, first out" would apply. While the decision in Kautch-
bull v. HaUett has been widely followed in the United States
these latter observations of the judges have had but slight effect
upon the American decisions; in a small number of cases con-
sideration of them has led to some confusion. In general, it may
be said that the intent of the defaulting trustee is of no impor-
tance F3
In the preceding cases, the controversy centered about the
balance left in an account, the withdrawals having disappeared.
If the trustee first withdraws the amount of his own funds, how-
ever, and later withdraws the amount of the trust funds, spend-
ing the latter but preserving the former intact, is the cestui pre-
cluded from setting up an interest in the former? The answer
has been that the cestui may follow any withdrawal from that
account and claim it or its substitute or product as long as he is
able to trace such funds. The case of In re Oatway 26 illustrates
the nature of the cestui's claim upon the combined bank account.
There earlier withdrawals were invested in shares by the trustee
for his own benefit, and the balance of the account was subse-
quently expended beyond possibility of finding any substitute.
The shares were held to belong to the trust estate.25 Accordingly
it" may be said that the cestui has an equitable claim against, or
charge upon, the whole of the "blended" fund represented by the
a correct principle had been abstractly laid down in Pennell v. Deffell, but
concluded that the use of the technique of Clayton's Case amounted to a
misapplication of the enunciated principle. Ibid. 729.
2 Ibid. 727.
2 Ibid. 743.23 See cases and discussion infra notes 99 to 109. This is especially true
of an agent or partner who has fraudulently converted the principal's or
the partnership property into cash and deposited the same. It would appear
ridiculous to hold that his intent.to dissipate a portion of the "blended"
account should deprive the principal or partners of all power to charge the
balance of the account with the amount misappropriated.
2 4 Supra note 10.
2 Contra: Gering v. Buerstetta, 223 N. W. 625 (Neb. 1929), where the
trust claimant was confined to tracing into the balance left in the account
and the product of such balance. Similarly, where the mingled bank
account exceeded by $3,700 the amount of the trust funds deposited therein,
and the trustee thereafter drew out $7,000 and deposited the same in
:nother bank, this case permitted the claimant to trace into the account
,;th the second bank only to the extent of $3,300. Ibid. 628, 629. The
.)n.tuctive trust here originated from the fraudulent acceptance of a
• eposit by the initial bank.
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bank account, to the amount of the trust funds, and can success-
fully assert such claim against any withdrawal from that fund
or the product of any withdrawal until the latter has passed to
a good faith purchaser." The remedy of the cestui then depends
completely upon an ability to trace the trust fund or the combined
fund into specific assets which can be termed the product of such
fund.
In the deposit cases cited above, the original chattel or chose
in action has, by necessity, been eliminated. What remains for
judicial consideration is the substitute-a debt owed by the bank
and represented by a balance on the books of the bank to the
credit of the depositor. What is the applicability of the principles
outlined in this brief survey to the situation where the bank
(and not a depositor) stands in a relation to some person which
a court will denominate fiduciary? This inquiry arises from the
fact that the bank has been entrusted with property of the prin-
cipal. but the res with which we now become concerned is of a
different kind-cash or some one of the many forms of com-
mercial instruments in general use in banking operations. The
situations while not identical are quite evidently comparable.2T
26 If the trustee or other fiduciary wrongfully deposits fiduciary moneys,
properly in his possession, in his own bank account, or if the converter so
deposits the proceeds of the conversion, he becomes a constructive trustee
of the claim against the bank for the benefit of the wronged cestul or
principal. If there was a previous credit in the bank account, it would
seem that the cestui should be considered an equitable co-tenant with the
constructive trustee, i.e., his interest in the total debt of the bank to the
trustee should be proportional to the amount of funds wrongfully deposited
by the latter. Hence the wronged person would have an undivided equitable
interest in the whole chose, from which it would logically follow that, if
one stopped with the constructive trust aspect of the situation, all deple-
tions of the credit by the constructive trustee would be of proportional
parts of the respective interests of trustee and cestui, and they would
retain their original proportional interest in whatever credit remained.
Such was the conclusion reached in Watson v. Thompson, 12 R. I. 466
(1879) (sale of parts of realty in which trustee and cestui were equitable
co-tenants) where plaintiff proceeded upon the theory of a constructive
trust in the combined fund. The concept of an equitable lien, whether ex-
pressed or not, is necessary in order to reach the interest of the constructive
trustee in the combined credit. But in the banking cases, the finding of a
constructive trust is sufficient to permit the cestui to claim successfully
any part of the combined fund; equitable lien is an unannounced follower
which always attends upon constructive trust. Apparently it need not be
pleaded since courts decree the results flowing from such concept although
only a trust has been dsserted by claimant.
27The factual distinctions are interesting, even though they may not call
for the application of different principles. In the first instance the bank
usually stands indifferent between wronged and wrongdoer, somewhat in the
position of a stakeholder; in the second, the bank itself is one of the
active principal parties; it is the agent, the fiduciary, the trustee. Ex parte
Dale & Co., 11 Ch. D. 772 (1879), and the subsequent criticism of that
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This article is principally concerned with the applicability of
the doctrines hieretofore considered to bank collection cases, i.e.,
in genera-, cases involving the collection of commercial instru-
ments by a Lank for some other person or bank. In the first
place, it is plain that if the doctrines are to be applicable some
relation which a court will call fiduciary must be found. Merely
an acknowledged relationship of debtor and creditor arising out
of A's handling of B's chattels will not justify resort to such
principles. In the collection cases, the existence of an agency
relationship generally supplies the necessary groundwork for
the invocation of the doctrines of equitable lien or constructive
trust. At times the use of the epithet "trustee ex m aeficio" is
not wholly inept.
When a customer places commercial paper with his bank for
collection, and such bank forwards the same on for collection to
a correspondent at the point where the paper is payable, the
position of the second bank is, according to the jurisdiction, de-
termined by one of two rules, known respectively as the Massa-
chusetts and New York rules. According to the former, the
second bank becomes the agent of the customer, and, as such, is
liable to him for default or neglect in effecting collection; under
the New York rule, the second bank is held the agent of the first
bank, not of the customer, and so is not ordinarily held respon-
sible to the customer, who must obtain redress in an action
against the first bank. The exemption of the second bank from
liability at the suit of the customer admits of an exception, how-
ever, in case the first bank becomes insolvent and the second has
received the customer's paper or the proceeds thereof and re-
fuses to pay the same .2  Obviously the same kind of action may
be maintained against the collecting bank under the Massachu-
setts rule, no matter what the condition of the first bank may
be. In either case as long as the second bank remains solvent a
money judgment against it is sufficient to reimburse the cus-
tomer. But a different situation presents itself when the second
bank fails without having paid over the amount which it has col-
case by the Court of Appeal indicate how the two situations are equated.
There the bank collected an item for the claimant and "wrongfully" mingled
the proceeds with the bank cash in such manner that they became uniden-
tifiable in specie. The following day the bank failed. Justice Fry, relying
upon such cases as Whitecomb v. Jacob and Scott v. Surman, both supra
note 2, held that claimant was not able to trace his money because it had bL-
come impossible to identify it in the larger mass. This case was disapproved
in Knatchbull v. Hallett, mpra note 19, in so far as it held that a cestui
could not follow his money into the combined fund. From the incomplete
statement of facts given, it does not definitely appear that claimant could
have traced the funds in any event.
2 Evansville Bank -v, German-American Bank, 155 U. S. 556, 15 Sup. Ct.
221 (1895); First Na-'onal Bank of Crown Point v. First National Bank,
76 Ind. 561 (1881).
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lected and a suit against the first bank for such default cannot
be maintained, or if maintainable would not be productive of full
reimbursement. The customer may treat the collecting bank as
his debtor if he wishes, but banks which have failed have a
notorious reputation for liquidating at less than is sufficient to
pay creditors in full. Consequently, if the customer is to come out
whole, his claim must be classified as preferred, entitling him to
priority of payment over general creditors.
Such preferences where given, if not authorized by statute, are
made to rest upon some "trust" theory. Plainly the bank effect-
ing collection is an agent in the handling of the paper. Does it
cease to be an agent once it has received payment of an item?
As has been suggested above, if this question is answered in the
affirmative the basis for any theories of equitable lien or con-
structive trust which would justify the preference is removed at
the outset. Wherever the issue has been directly raised the
states appear to be about evenly divided on the question; what
seems to be the better view holds that once collection has been
made, the- collecting bank becomes a simple debtor.2  The argu-
ment is that, as the collecting bank becomes absolutely liable for
the amount of the item immediately upon collection, it thereby
divests itself of the character of agent and its subsequent hand-
ling of the collection proceeds cannot be termed a misappropria-
tion of such funds, irrespective of what is done with them. The
imposition of an absolute liability for such amount seems to
negative effectively any notion that the obligor was a fiduciary.
On the other hand the protagonists of the opposing view insist
that the agency (or some other fiduciary) relation continues
because an agent is powerless, with respect to the principal's
property in his possession, to change the fiduciary relationship
which he bears toward that principal without the latter's con-
sent.30 An examination of the fact situation is necessary in con-
sidering the validity of either view.
29 See cases cited infra note 35. If the bank collects at a time when it is
insolvent to the knowledge of its officers the result is different. In order
to grant relief in such a case, the fiction of withdrawal of authority to
collect is utilized and a trust ex malefic'o decreed. Hutchinson v. National
Bank of Commerce, 145 Ala. 196, 41 So. 143 (1906); Western German Bank
v. Norvell, 134 Fed. 724 (C. C. A. 5th, 1905).
so Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928); National Life
Ins. Co. v. Mather, 118 Ill. App. 491 (1905); Leach v. Farmers Trust &
Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 1343, 217 N. W. 445 (1928) ; Bank of Poplar Bluff
v. Millspaugh, 313 Mo. 412, 281 S. W. 733 (1926); Hawaiian Pineapple
Co. v. Browne, 69 Mont. 140, 220 Pac. 1114 (1923); Federal Reserve Bank
v. Peters, 139 Va. 45, 123 S. E. 379 (1924) ; Foster v. Rineker, 4 Wyo. 484,
35 Pac. 470 (1894). "An agent should not be permitted by its act alone
to change the relation by sending its check and so convert its trust fund




As typical of collection transactions, one may take that hereto-
fore posed: one bank, either on its own account or for a customer,
forwards for collection to another bank an item payable at the
locus of the second. The forwarding bank in its covering form-
letter will advise the second bank that the item is sent "For
collection and returns" or "For collection and remittance" or
simply "For collection." Current banking practice gives a defi-
nite meaning to "returns" or "remittance." It is plain that the
use of neither term contemplates that the second bank shall
remit to the first the exact medium in which collection is ef-
feted.P1 The collecting bank, according to the practically uni-
versal custom, is expected to make settlement by transmitting its
draft on some other bank or on the first bank, if the second car-
ries an account with the first. If the instructions are simply
"For collection" and the first bank does not have an account
-with the second, remittance is expected in the same way. Con-
sequently it is idle to assume that the collector is expected to keep
the proceeds of the collection separate and apart from its own
funds and accounts. 2 The necessary inference from the usual
course of business would seem to be that the agent collecting
bank is authorized to convert itself into a simple debtor. The
forwarder of the item relies upon the presumed general sound-
ness of tle collector as a going business organization and not
upon ownership of the specific medium in which payment is made
to the collector. He puts his trust, in so far as any particular
item is concerned, no less in the general credit standing of the
bank than does the purchaser of a draft or a general depositorP
3The incongruity of an attempt to justify a holding that the agency
relation did not change, because of instructions to "collect and remit" is
well illustrated by First State Bank v. OBannon, =p a note 30. Any
court which seizes upon the words "and remittance" and holds them to mean
that the very medium of collection Is to be sent to the forwarding bank
discloses a surprising ignorance of collection technique. See First Nationni
Bank v. Davis, inf/a note 38. Note the astounding statement of the Kansw
court that the words "use the money" are applicable to a collect-and-credit
situation but not to a collect-and-remit transaction. People's State Bank v.
Burlington State Bank, 277 Pac. 39 (Kan. 1929).
2 How little appreciation some courts have of the actualities in the
banking cases is illustrated by some of the remarks in Hawaiian Pineapple
Co. v. Browne, supra note 30, at 146, 220 Pac. at 1115: " . . . the Havre
bank [the collector] could only receive cash in payment of the draft
[the collection item] and it could only discharge its duty by remitting
the cash collected to the Chicago bank." In other words, the duty can
be discharged only in a manner in which a bank is never expected to,
act (unless specifically instructed so to do), and which is directly contrary
to banking practice in every part of the country.
"This article does not attempt an analysis of the arguments advanced
from policy that in every case the forwarder of a collection item should
be entitled to a preference for the amount of a collected but unremitted
item upon failure of the collecting bank These arguments are chiefly
19301 987
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From the technical viewpoint, further questions may be raised.
After the collecting bank, as agent or bailee of the principal's
property, has performed its duty of changing the collection item
into some other form, does the substitute belong to the prin-
cipal? If the agent's only duty were to retain that exact substi-
tute for the principal no doubt it would be reasonable to consider
it the property of the latter. But if it is the further duty of the
:agent to change the substitute into still another form, and that
,other form is the agent's own obligation (evidenced by its draft),
obviously the substitute would seem to have gone to pay for
the quondam agent's obligation and, by the process of exchange,
would seem to belong to the agent. Other questions present
themselves: Did the substitute ever become the property of the
principal? Or did the agent become a debtor immediately upon
making the first conversion? If not at that early moment, then
surely the property must cease to be that of the principal when
the agent issues some evidence of its obligation.3 But since the
-two: (1) That the owner ii forced by business necessity to entrust the
handling of his items to a distant institution which he either has no voice
in selecting or cannot select upon any intelligent basis; hence that if he
is denied a preference he is made an involuntary creditor of a failed bank
upon the same footing with those who freely chose their banking connec-
tion; (2) That according the owners of collected items preferential treat-
mient would be productive of considerable economy in the conduct of bank
receiverships by eliminating the mass of litigation now flowing through the
courts regarding the application of bank assets to the payment of collection
claims. Although no data seems to be available on the latter point, a
sifting of the banking cases makes it plain that large sums are being ex-
pended in the course of such litigation. In regard to a specialized situa-
tion, namely, where an item is forwarded directly to the drawee bank
for payment, Professor R. B. Turner in his article Bank Collections-The
Direct Routing Practice (1930) 39 YALE L. J. 468, 487, takes the view that
the owner of the forwarded item should always be given a preference in
case the drawee's draft in payment remains unpaid because of the failure
,of the drawee (or in case the collection item has been discharged and the
,drawee has failed to remit); that the practice of giving preferences in
:such cases would merely compensate owners for the increased risks other-
-wise attendant upon the increasing use of direct routing to drawees. He
regards the contention that the debtor-credit6r relation is established by
-reason of the privilege of the collector to mingle the proceeds and to remit
'in exchange as an "outworn rationalization in disregard of changing con-
.ditions."
34 The principal would seem in effect a purchaser of the agent's draft.
'The purchaser of a bank draft is a creditor and not a cestui, and is not
-entitled to a preference in case the issuing bank fails before the draft is
-paid. Peterson v. Peiter, 46 Idaho 43, 266 Pac. 429 (1928) (cashier's
check); Clark v. Toronto Bank, 72 Kan 1, 82 Pac. 582 (1905),'l Massey-
Harris Harvester Co. v. First State Bank, 122 Kan. 483, 252 Pac. 247
(1927) (cashier's check); Jourdan v. Bennett, 119 Miss. 576, 81 So. 239
(1919); Leach v. Iowa State 'Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 95, 211 N. W. 515
(1926); Leach v. Exchange Bank, 203 Iowa 790, 211 N. W. 516 (1926);
Andrew v. C. M. & St. P. Ry., 211 N. W. 515 (Iowa 1926); American
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draft is supposed to be evidence of a previously existing obli-
gation and is merely part of the machinery for effecting a settle-
ment of obligations between the banks, why did not the debtor
position of the collector arise before such time?
It has accordingly been held that the proceeds of a collection
are not trust funds,35 or that they cease to be such when once
mingled with the bank's own funds.30 Some courts have seized
upon an express direction to do that which is always implied (in
the absence of contrary instructions) to find that the agency
ceases upon collection. Thus, if the collecting bank is instructed
to remit in a -certain type of exchange,37 or authority so to
remit can be implied, -", the agency has been said to terminate
upon collection. Whether the kind of exchange is designated or
not should not affect the result reached, for in the absence of
Express Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., 239 Mass. 249, 132 N. E. 26 (1921);
Legniti v. Mechanics & Metals National Bank, 230 N. Y. 415, 130 N. E.
597 (1921) (obiter); cf. In re Citizens State Bank, 44 Idaho 33, 255 Pac.
300 (1927); Bowman v. First National Bank, 9 Wash. 614, 38 Pac. 211
(1894). Contra, if the bank is insolvent to the knowledge of the officers
at the time the draft is sold: Union State Bank v. People's State Bank, 192
Wis. 28, 211 N. W. 931 (1927).
-First National Bank v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 585 (E. D. N. C. 1926);
Smith Reduction Corporation v. Williams, 15 F. (2d) 874 (E. D. N. C.
1926) (unless collection is made when insolvent to knowledge of officers);
Akin v. Jones, 93 Tenn. 353, 27 S. W. 669 (1894); Hallam v. Tillinghast,
19 Wash. 20, 52 Pac. 329 (1898); Union National Bank v. Citizens Bank,
153 Ind. 44, 54 N. E. 97 (1899) ; Hecker-Junes-Jewell Milling Co. v. Cos-
mopolitan Trust Co., 242 Mass. 181, 136 N. E. 333 (1922); Citizens Bank
v..Bradley, 136 S. C. 511, 134 S. E. 510 (1926); Peters Shoe Co. v. Murray,
31 Tex. Civ. App. 259, 71 S. W. 977 (1903).
36 First National Bank v. Wilmington & W. R. R., 7T Fed. 401 (C. C. A.
4th, 1896) (obiter); Manufacturers Bank v. Continental Bank, 148 Mass.
553, 20 N. E. 193. (1889); North Carolina Corp. Comm. v. Mlerchants' &
Farmers' Bank, 137 N. C. 697, 50 S. E. 308 (1905); cf. Young v. Teutonia
Bank & Trust Co., 134 La. 879, 64 So. 80 (1914); Sabine Canal Co. v.
Crowley Trust & Savings Bank, 164 La. 33, 113 So. 754 (1927). It is
sometimes difficult to determine whether the court, in denying a preference,
is more impressed by the view that the principal-agent relation ceases upon
mingling or by the impossibility of identifying the proceeds in a mixed
fund or account. See Bank of Commerce v. Russell, supra note 11.
The denial of a preference by a .referee and the conclusion that only a
debtor-creditor relationship arose was approved in Fant v. Dinkins, 149
S. C. 363, 147 S. E. 312 (1929), the referee basing his conclusion upon
acceptance by the forwarder of the collector's draft.
37 Colorado & Southern Ry. v. Docking, 124 Kan. 48, 257 Pac. 743 (1927);
Akin v. Jones, supra note 35; Sayles v. Cox, 95 Tenn. 579, 32 S. W. 626
(1895). Contra: Darragh Co. v. Goodman, 124 Ark. 532, 187 S. W. 673
(1916); Holder v. Western German Bank, 136 Fed. 9Q (C. C. A. 6th,
2905).
38 California Packing Co. v. McClintock, 75 Mont. 72, 241 Pac. 1077
(1925) ; First National Bank v. Davis, 114 N. C. 343, 19 S. E. 280 (1894)
(express general agreement to "remit daily").
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other iiistructions the collecting bank is always expected to remit
in a draft on its correspondent. Judicial notice of this custom
is taken by the courts of Washington and New Mexico. 0  The
former state concludes that such a custom destroys the agency
relation:
"The custom of bankers in regard to making collections and
remittances therefor is so well established and has become so
universally known, that knowledge thereof must be imputed to
courts; and they are therefore required to take judicial notice of
the fact that a bank, when it makes a collection for a foreign
correspondent, never, unless specifically directed so to do, remits
the specie collected, but, instead, thereof, always takes the specie
to its own use; and sends therefor its draft or certificate of de-
posit. . . . If this was the general custom the legal effect of for-
warding the collection and directing remittance of the proceeds
would be the same as though the money had been paid to the
bank for its draft, which it was at the same time required to
issue; and such a transaction between a bank and one of its
customers has never been held to create any trust relation be-
tween such customer and the bank.", 1
Similarly, the New Mexico court finds that when the draft has
been remitted, the money "drops out of the case as the basis of
the relation and the draft" comes in; likewise that there is no
equity in favor of the forwarder of the item "superior to that
of one, who, having a payment to make at a distint point, paid
his money into the bank and received therefor the bank's draft
with which to make his remittance." 14
MBowman v. First National Bank, mupra note 84; Ryer Grain Co. v.
American Security Bank, 147 Wash. 42, 264 Pac. 1000 (1928). But cf. First
National Bank v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 137 Wash. 835, 242 Pac.
356 (1926).
1-o State v. McKinley County Bank, 32 N. M. 147, 252 Pac. 980 (1927).
The Iowa court has declined to take notice of this custom, or even to give
any effect to it although the litigants stipulate its existence, because of a
desire not to "complicate" the situation or "disturb well-settled rules" on
the matter. Leach v. City-Commercial Savings Bank, 219 N. W. 496 (Iorwa
1928).
a Bowman v. First National Bank, supra note 34, at 618, 88 Pac. at 212.
'-
2 State v. McKinley County Bank, supra note 40. Requirement of actual
forwarding of the draft was injected into the case in order to reconcile It
with First National Bank v. Dennis, 20 N. M. 96, 146 Pac. 948 (1915),
where a trust in collection proceeds was decreed, because, "in fraud of the
agreement," the collecting bank had made no move to remit before closing
its doors. But this requirement was elaborated in Sinclair Refining Co.
v. Tierney, 270 Pac..792, 793 (N. M. 1928) where after citing State
v. McKinley County Bank, supra, the court said: "In the latter case we
held that the status of the collecting bank changed from trustee to debtor
when it had collected and had followed instructions by remitting. The
converse is true, that a failure to remit in accordance with instructions
would result in the status remaining unchanged." See review of New
Mexico cases in Board of Commissioners v. People's Bank, 279 Pac. 60
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Whatever objection there may be to divesting the transaction
of its fiduciary nature immediately upon collection, it would
seem reasonable to assert that, once remittance has been made
in the usual or instructed manner, i.e., by bank draft, there
is no longer any validity to an attempt to impress a trust char-
acter upon the funds.43  This is subject to exception, however,
where the circumstances are such as would raise a constructive
trust or trust ex madeficio in regard to a general deposit, namely,
receipt of such funds at a time when the bank was insolvent to
the knowledge of its officers."'
Turning now to those states which apply the doctrines of trust
to the proceeds, even after a credit instrument has been issued
as a substitute for them, the initial difficulty of considering such
funds as fiduciary funds is generally no difficulty at all; the sol-
vent is the ready assumption that the "trust" character continues.
If the bank mingles the collection funds with its own funds, it is
assimilated to the position of the defaulting trustee and the
preferential recovery by the forwarder is made to depend upon
the utilization of certain fictions which have been devised in the
course of decision. Failure of the collecting bank to remit is
treated as a breach of fiduciary duty and a constructive trust is
(N. M. 1929). In United States National Bank v. Glanton, 146 Ga. 786, 92
S. E. 625 (1917), drafts were forwarded for collection, but without instruc-
tions as to kind of remittance. The court said: "When the collecting bank
sent its check in the usual course of business, no trust existed, but on the
contrary... the relation was simply that of debtor and creditor." The
Massachusetts court realistically observed in Hecker-Jones-Jewell Lilling
Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 35: "Ordinarily when 9" draft
has been paid to the collecting bank, the owner's right of control ceases,
and the relation between collecting bank and the owner ceases to be that
of agent to principal, and becomes that of debtor to creditor."
- If there is an agreement or understanding that remittance shall be
made by "draft", and the bank fails before the draft is paid, the forwarder
"is not now in a position to urge a claim of preference by virtue of non-
payment of said draft against" the funds in the hands of the receiver."
Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 894, 211 N. W. 517 (1926).
1... .where a bank issues its draft with authority and in conformity to
instructions the relationship thereafter is that of debtor and creditor, and
not of principal and agent or of trustee and cestui que trust.... The
rule is quite universal that any agreement or understanding whereby the
bank is to use the identical money collected and substitute its own obliga-
tion in its stead, that the theory of a trust does not exist." Leach v. Battle
Creek Savings Bank, 203 Iowa 507, 511,-211 N. WV. 520, 522 (1926). The
Iowa court has had occasion to apply this rule many times in recent years.
Leach v. Battle Creek Savings Bank, 202 Iowa 875, 211 N. W. 527 (1926) ;
Valentine Y. Andrew, 203 Iowa 463, 212 N. W. 674 (1927); Andrew v.
Darrow Trust & Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 870, 216 N. W. 553 (1927);
Leach v. City-Commercial Savings Bank, supra note 40; Leach v. Farmers
& Merchants Savings Bank, 220 N. W. 10 (Iowa 1928).
4Western German Bank v. Norvell, supra note 29; of. First National
Bank v. Williams; Smith Reduction Corp. v. Williams, both supra note 35.
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raised in order to bring into play all the remedial devices attach-
ing thereto, as much as if the customer's paper had been con-
verted by a thief. Having thus, by the simple method of ignor-
ing the alternative, determined that the fiduciary relation per-
sists, the only remaining hurdle is that of identification. Up
to this point the claimant is permitted to run his course with
scarcely the simulacrum of opposition. But here the hazards
await him in regimented series. Some, however, are more ap-
parent than real, owing to the availability of the fictions pre-
viously mentioned.
Influenced by the "modern rule of equity" as enunciated in
KWachbuU v. Halett45 and apparently unaware of the limita-
tions implicit in that case, several American courts glossed over
the matter of identification of the "trust res" in a substituted
form and imposed a lien upon, or raised a constructive trust in
respect of, all the assets of an insolvent bank, provided it were
merely shown that the bank had received the proceeds of the
collection.46 The subsequent disposition or identification of any
asset as being produced in whole or in part from such proceeds
was not a matter regarded as requiring investigation. In so far
as the owner of the item and the bank were concerned, the justice
of such a result was unquestionable; but where other creditors
are concerned the right to take any portion of the assets of an
insolvent to the exclusion of such creditors must be rested
upon proof that that portion is the property of the claimant or
the product of his property. A trust relationship with respect
to any particular asset is not to be established by a mere show-
ing that a trustee violated his duty to the beneficiary. And
without some identification of assets as the produce of the mis-
applied funds the claimant has no reason to be treated otherwise
than as a creditor.47
,15 Supra note 19.
46 Independent District v. King, 80 Iowa 497, 45 N. W. 908 (1890) ; of.
Davenport Plow Co. v. Lamp, 80 Iowa 722, 45 N. W. 1049 (1890). Also
Bunton v. King, 80 Iowa 506, 45 N. W. 1050 (1890); Peak v. Ellicott, 309
Kan. 156, 1 Pac. 499 (1883); Harrison v. Smith, 83 Mo. 210, (1884);
German Fire Ins. Co. v. Kimble, 66 Mo. App. 370 (1896); Thompson v.
Gloucester City Savings Inst., 8 Atl. 97 (N. J. Ch. 1887) ; People v. Bank of
Dansville, 39 Hun 187 (1886); Jones v. Kilbreth, 49 Ohio St. 401, 31 N. E.
346 (1892); McLeod v. Evans, 66 Wis. 401, 28 N. W. 173 (1886). Peak
v. Ellicott was not a collection case, but the same matter of the Identifica-
tion of trust funds was involved.'
47 Compare Multnomah County v. Oregon National Bank, 61 Fed. 912,
914 (C. C. Ore. 1894).: "The so-called right to be preferred in case of
wrongful conversion is a right of ownership-a right of property; a right
which lays hold of the property whether in its original or in a substituted
form; a right which follows the property -so long as it can be ascertained
to be the same property or its product and only does so because the property
to be reached can be ascertained to be the same property or its product.
When the means of ascertainment of the identity of property or proceeds
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There exists today, outside of some statutes to be noted later,
little authority for imposing a lien upon the general assets of an
insolvent bank. The Wisconsin cases have been expressly over-
ruled,48 those in New York were soon explained away,4" and the
Iowa court has whittled down most of the rule applied in the case
of Plow Company v. Lamp; so the Kansas court has come to the
conclusion that its earlier decisions did not inquire closely enough
into the matter of identification," and Missouri seems to have
receded to some degree from its earlier position.2  The greater-
number of states by far require that there shall be a tracing
of the proceeds of collection into specific assets which come into
the possession of a receiver,53 a requirement that is sometimes
fail, the right fails." Also Hanover National Bank v. Thomas, 217 Ala. 494,
117 So. 42 (1928).: "The equitable right to trace the trust fund and impress
the fund with which it has been commingled or the property into which
it has been merged, -with the trust, is rested upon the right of property and
not on a theory of a preference arising from an unlawful conversion." Cf.
Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 212 N. W. 748 (1927).
4 sNonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, 87 Wis. 237, 58 N. W. 383 (1894).
49 Cavin v. Gleason, 105 N. Y. 256, 11 N. E. 504 (1887).
50 Supra note 46.
W. Arnold Investment Co. v. Citizens State Bank, 98 Kan. 412, 158 Pac. 68
(1916); Miller v. Viola State Bank, 121 Kan. 193, 246 Pac. 517 (1926);
Chetopa State Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' Bank, 114 Kn. 463, 218 Fac.
1000 (1923) (obiter). The Kansas cases, however, leave much to be desired
in the way of clarification.
52Federal Reserve Bank v. Millspaugh, 314 Mo. 1, 282 S. W. 706 (1926).
53Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd, 38 Fed. 172 (E. D. N. C. 1889);
Merchants' & Farmers' Bank v. Austin, 48 Fed. 25 (C: C. N. D. Ala. 1891) ;
Mpltnomah County v. Oregon National Bank, supra note 47; Boone County
National Bank v. Latimer, 67 Fed. 27 (C. C. W. D. Mo. 1895); City Bank
v. Blackmore, 75 Fed. 771 (C. C. A. 6th, 1896); In Te Mulligan, 116 Fed.
715 (D. Mass. 1902); American Can Co. v. Williams, 178 Fed. 420 (C.
C. A. 2d, 1910); Titlow v. McCormick, 236 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916);
State Bank of Winfield v. Alva Security Bank, 232 Fed. 847 (C. C. A. 8th,
1916); Anadarko Cotton Oil Co. v. Litteer, 300 Fed. 222 (E. D. Okia.
1924) ; Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, 3 F. (2d)
648 (D. Ore. 1925); First National Bank v. DicRson, 26 F. (2d) 411 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1928); Burnes National Bank v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (S. D.
Iowa 1928); Steele Briggs Seed Co. v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 42 (S. D. Iowa
1928) ; St. Louis Brewing Ass'n. v. Austin, 100 Ala. 313, 13 So. 908 (1893) ;
Rainwater v. Wildman, 172 Ark. 521, 289 S. W. 488 (1927); Ober & Sons
Co. v. Cochran, 118 Ga. 396, 45 S. E. 382 (1903) ; Citizens National Bank v.
Haynes 144 Ga. 490, 87 S. E. 399 (1916) (special deposit); National Bank
of the Republic v. Porter, 44 Idaho 514, 258 Pac. 544 (1927) ; Woodhoure v.
Crandall, 197 Ill. 104, 64 N. E. 292 (1902) (special deposit); Hudspeth
v. Union Trust & Savings Bank, 197 Iowa 913, 193 N. W. 279 (1923) ; Leach
v. Iowa State Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 497, 212 N. W. 748 (1927); Andrew
v. Darrow Trust & Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 870, 216 N. W. 553 (1927);
Andrew v. State Bank of New Hampton, 205 Iowa 1064, 217 N. W. 250
(1928); Andrew v. Hartley State Bank, 207 Iowa 407, 219 N. W. 929
(1928); Arnold Investment Co. v. Citizens State Bank, supra note 51;
Miller v. Viola State Bank, supra note 51; Salem Elevator Works v. Corn-
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conveniently lightened by the use of well-known trust formulae.
It is therefore surprising to find that some courts have, in
comparatively- recent cases, decreed trusts and granted prefer-
ences to claimants where, by the most liberal construction of
ordinary tracing rules possible, one could not reasonably say that
it had been shown that any asset possessed by the collecting bank
at the time it closed its doors had been produced in any degree
by the substitute for the collection item. So far as appears from
the reported facts in the Pennsylvania case of Cameron v. Car-
negie Trust Co.,5' there is not the slightest semblance of tracing
the claimant's proceeds into the assets of the failed bank; never-
theless a preference was granted. There the collection item was
paid in cash. The report is silent as to the amount of cash on
hand in the bank at any time, and nothing appears as to any in-
vestments made. After determining that a trust ex malefico
arose from the act of mingling the collection proceeds with the
bank's money at a time when the bank was insolvent, the
opinion continues with a consideration of the passages from
Pomeroy set out in the footnotes 5 and the court concludes:
" . ..admittedly the money belonging to appellant was in-
cluded in the trust company's general assets which were at all
times sufficiently large to make good the amount due, and the
missioner of Banks, 252 Mass. 366, 148 N. B. 220 (1925); Billingsley v.
Pollock, 69 Miss. 759, 13 So. 828 (1892); State v. Banking Corporation, 77
Mont. 134, 251 Pac. 151 (1926); State v. Bank of Commerce, 54 Neb. 725,
75 N. W. 28 (1898); Morrison v. Lincoln Savings Bank & Safe Deposit Co.,
57 Neb. 225, 77 N. W. 655 (1898); Ellicott v. Kuhl, 60 N. J. Eq. 333, 46
Atl. 945 (1900) (not a banking case); Daughtry v. International Bank of
Commerce, 18 N. M. 119, 134 Pac. 220 (1913) ; Board of Commissioners v.
Clapp, 24 N. M. 522, 174 Pac. 998 (1918); North Dakota Elevator Co. v.
Clark, 3 N. D. 26, 53 N. W. 175 (1892); Hall v. Sullivan, 123 0kla. 238,
253 Pac. 45 (1926) ; Muhlenberg v. Northwest Loan & Trust Co., 26 Ore.
132, 38 Pac. 932 (1894); Yeldell v. People's Bank, 118 S. C. 442, 110 S. E.
789 (1922); Piano Mfg. Co. v. Auld, 14 S. D. 512, 86 N. W. 21 (1901);
Farmers State Bank v. Smith, 53 S. D. 641, 222 N. W. 143 (1928); North.
western National Bank v. James Valley Bank, 53 S. D. 467, 221 N. W. 82
(1928); Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, supra note 48; Lusk Development
Co. v. Ginther, 32 Wyo. 294, 232 Pac. 518 (1925).
54 292 Pa. 114, 140 Atl. 768 (1928).
55 "If the beneficiary can show that the trustee's estate, al it came into
the hands of his assignee, trustee in bankruptcy, receiver, executor or
administrator, was actually increased by the whole or a definite portion of
the misappropriated trust fund, justice demands that he, and not the other
creditors, should have the benefit of this increase .... It is now the well
settled rule, that where withdrawals from the mixed fund, with or without
subsequent replenishing from the trustee's individual money, have not at
any time reduced the balance to a sum less than the trust fund deposited,
the cestui que trust, as against the trustee's creditors, is entitled to pay-
ment in full; his money is sufficiently identified as having always been con-
tained within the blended fund." 3 POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE (4th
ed. 1918) § 1048 (e).
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effect of refusing relief would be to give to other distributees a.
larger sum than they would have received but for the fraud
practiced on appellant." It is apparent that the court'in making-
this last statement shifts its ground from the cited statement of
Pomeroy on which it purports to rely. The Pomeroy statement
speaks of withdrawals from a mixed or blended fund, which in
the present case could be nothing other than the cash in the bank
increased by the addition of the cash received for plaintiff's col-
lection. The reference to the trust company's "general assets"
can mean nothing less than the general estate of the company.
The court approaches dangerously close to the rejected doctrine
of McLeod v. Eva=,&O which has met with such general disap-
proval and which has been disowned in the house of its creator. 7
The mere fact that the estate is sufficiently large at all times to
pay the amount does not justify the granting of a preference; -1
nor does the mere fraudulent conduct of a trustee resulting in the
declaration of a trust ex maleficio.1 While the attempt to dis-
tinguish the case from other Pennsylvania decisions is generally
fairly successful on the facts, the court treats the case of Webb-
v. NewAl - as controlling. This case, however; had an all-im-
portant distinguishing feature: the agent (trustee) had deposited
the claimant's funds in his own bank account, and the latter at all
times constituted a separable asset (or fund) which it was per-
fectly apparent had been built up in part at least by claimant's
funds, and to which, under gckmowledged equitable principles, a
lien attached in favor of the claimant.
In Eifel v. Vogel,61 a note owned by the plaintiff was collected
by the bank fifteen months before its failure; settlement therefor
was never made; in the opinion nothing appears as to the medium
in which payment was received and there is no attempt made to
trace. The court contents itself with the simple statement: "The
title to the proceeds of the note did not pass to the bank, but re-
mained in the plaintiff, and as they augmented the assets of the-
bank to the amount thereof, plaintiff is entitled to have the full
amount paid to him." For all that appears the plaintiffs money-
might have been expended for bank advertising or contributed
to charity.2
56 Supra note 46.
,
5 T Nonotuck Silk Co. v. Flanders, supra note 48;.cf. Freiberg v. Stoddart,.
161 Pa. 259, 28 AtL 1111 (1894).
68 Thompson's Appeal, 22 Pa. 16 (1853).
5 "A trust creditor merely as such has no preference over others." Webb
v. Newhall, 274 Pa. 135, 117 AtL 793 (1922).
1 Supra note 59; cf. In re Vosburgh's Estate, 279 Pa. 329, 123 At!. 813
(1924).
67 169 Minn. 281, 211 N. W. 332 (1926).
62Although the Eifel case does not dizcuss the matter of identification,
subsequent Minnesota preference cases have considered it in Eome detail,.
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Equally objectionable was the four to three decision of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in Central National Bank v. First
National Bank,,63 where the owner forwarded four notes to
defendant bank for collection. Two of the notes were paid by
checks drawn on the collecting bank; one was renewed, the
renewal sold, and the proceeds used in some unknown man-
ner by the collector; the fourth was eventually returned to
the owner. The owner claimed a preference for $4,467; cash
on hand in the bank at time of failure was $1,370. Upon
rehearing, the court's earlier decision was reversed and prefer-
ences were accorded the owner for the amount of the first three
notes and the collected -interest. Rationalization was at-
tempted in this manner: the collecting bank "hid the trust
funds in a wilderness of banking assets" where the converted'
property could not be identified; the proceeds of plaintiff's
notes augmented the deposits of the insolvent bank, thus
increasing the general assets; the general creditors have no
greater rights to plaintiff's converted trust property than defend-
ant; before distribution can be made, the assets must be reduced
to a common fund; upon completion of that process all property,
real, personal and mixed, must be reduced to money-a single
fund in the hands of the receiver; "plaintiff's property, changed
in form by fraud, is in that fund." Counsel admitted, and the
majority of the court proceeded upon the assumption, that the
proceeds could not be traced into any specific assets. The ex-
treme position taken is that if at any time the estate of the in-
solvent bank has been benefited by the conversion of the
principal's property a preference should be granted. Thus:
"All that seems to us to be 'manifest,' in considering plaintiff's
right to a preference over general creditors, is that it is im-
material whether the converted proceeds were used to purchase
the bank building-or reduced the insolvent bank's indebtedness
by which items of property were burdened." All necessity of
tracing is thus eliminated; a presumption that the 'bank's
indebtedness has been reduced by the use of claimant's proceeds
will suffice to justify a preference." But on what theory do the
and, relying upon Stein v. Kemp, 132 Minn. 44, 155 N. W. 1052 (1916),
where a literal presumption of honesty was indulged in, have decided that
the plaintiff's "burden of proof goes no further than to require plaintiffs
to show that the money actually came into the hands of the bank." East-
man v. Farmers State Bank, 175 Minn. 366, 221 N. W. 236 (1928); cf.
Blythe v. Kujawa, 175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168 (1928) (special deposit
cases).
63 115 Neb. 472, 216 N. W. 302 (1927); also 115 Neb. 444, 213 N. W.
745 (1927).
64 The court in its opinion after rehearing, it is true, stated that the
following principle was adopted: "Where the beneficiary of a trust, in an
action to establish a preferred claim as a charge against the general a.osei
of an insolvent bank in the hands of a receiver, traces the trust fund thr-ugn
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Tights of the claimant with respect to items of property bur-
dened by the general indebtedness of the bank rise any higher
than those of the persons who have been paid by the use of
claimant's proceeds? Presumably, to follow the majority's line
of reasoning, those proceeds have been used to pay depositors,
general creditors. On that basis, how can the plaintiff claim
-more than to be subrogated to the rights of such depositors? 3
The proposition that once the estate has been augmented by
the proceeds the right to a preference has been established
is, however, not considered tenable by most courts,"" identifica-
-tion by a tracing process being required.07
-conversion of the bank into the mass of its assets, the burden of proof is
-on the receiver... to prove that the assets were not augmented by the
-conversion or that the trust fund disappeared from the assets, if the
defence is based on those grounds." But the dissenting opinion on the
-previous hearing (213 N. W. 747) was expressly adopted as the opinion of
the court, and the latter emphatically voices the "principle" that even
though the converted proceeds are used for the payment of the bank's
indebtedness, the right to a preference continues.
65 See talk of subrogation in Leach v. City-Commercial Savings Bank, 219
1N. W. 496, 500, 224 N. W. 583 (Iowa 1929).
66 Commercial National Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct. 533
(1893); Drovers National Bank v. Roller, 85 Md. 495, 37 Atl 30 (1897)
(agent's deposit of trust funds in personal account); State v. Farmers
State Bank, 54 Mont. 515, 172 Pac. 130 (1918); White v. Bank, 60 S. C.
122, 38 S. E. 453 (1901); Spokane v. First National Bank, 68 Fed. 979 (C.
C. A. 9th, 1895); cases cited supra note 53.
67 Upon a third hearing of this case, the decision upon rehearing was
Teversed and preference denied; one justice having been replaced, his
successor along with the previous minority decided that, inasmuch as the
insolvent institution was a national bank, the determination of -what were
assets presented a federal question. Accordingly the court held that the
course of decision in the federal courts showed that it "is indispensable
-to the maintenance by a cestui que trust of a claim to preferential payment
by a receiver out of the proceeds of the estate of an insolvent that clear
proof be made that the trust property or its proceeds went into a specific
fund or into a specifically identified piece of property which came to the
hands of the receiver, and then the claim can be sustained to the fund
-or property only and only to the extent that the trust proi~erty or its
proceeds went into it. It is not sufficient to prove that trust property or
its.proceeds went into the general assets of the insolvent estate." Central
National Bank v. First National Bank, 118 Neb. 161, 162, 219 N. W. 894,
895 (1928). Likewise, in Gering v. Buerstetta, supra note 25, the court
talked as if the matter of preference in the case of a failed national bank
must be decided according to the course of decision in the federal courts;
but in addition to the citation of federal cases it relied upon its own inter-
mediate decision in State v. Citizens State Bank, 117 Neb. 358, 220 N. W.
593 (1928), where the idea of a general lien attaching to all the assets of
the insolvent collecting bank was in effect repudiated and a preference re-
fused where it was impossible to trace. The latter case may be distinguished
from Central National Bank v. First National Bank on the tenuous ground
that it was affirmatively shown therein how the produce of claimant's col-
lection was dissipated while there was no evidence on that point in the
YALE LAW JOURNAL
MEDIA OF COLLECTION
Cash. The initial step in the process of identification is, of'
course, a determination of the medium in which payment of the
item has been made.68 Assuming that the collecting bank has'
been taken in charge by a receiver and that settlement for a col-
lection has not been obtained by the forwarder, the latter indis-
putably traces its property if the cash received has been kept in
a separate fund,6 or if any of the instruments named in the last.
three categories mentioned in the footnote remains unpaid in the
possession of the bank and passes to the receiver. Under such
conditions the owner is entitled to recover in specie the substitute
for the item, and if, after taking charge, the receiver collects
any such instrument from the drawee or obligor, he holds its
proceeds as a trustee for the owner who may take the appropriate
steps to charge him as such.70 If cash has been received by the
collecting bank and the same has become indistinguishably min-
gled with the cash of the bank, no difficulty of tracing exists'
at this point and the owner is entitled to a lien on the mixed
fund to the extent of his own contribution. But cash in a bank
is not an unvarying component of the bank's resources; it is
being continually received and paid out. Here the situation is
analogous to that in Knatchbutt v. Hallett,71' and the rule of that
case has been widely applied by American courts. If the mingled
cash fund is reduced by withdrawals in the course of business
the lien of the claimant attaches to. the balance remaining.72
Central National Bank case, all involving a question of burden of proof. In
the Gering case burden of proof was placed on the claimant.
68 The following represent the forms in which the proceeds of a collection
are, for the most part, initially found:
(1) Cash.
(2) Check of the payor drawn on the collecting bank.
(3) Check of the payor drawn on some other bank.
(4) Some obligation of the payor which the collecting bank has taken
in payment.
(5) Draft or cashier's check of some other bank.
The term "payor" is here used broadly to indicate the person who makes
payment whether he be the maker of a note, the drawee of a check or draft,
or some other person who makes payment on behalf of the maker, drawee,
indorser or other party.
69 Cf. Corn Exchange National Bank v. Solicitors' Loan Co., 188 Pa.
330, 41 Atl. 536 (1898).
7oAmerican Can Co. v. Williams, supra note 53. The same holds whore
the receiver collects the item deposited with the bank when known to bo
insolvent by officers. Raynor v. Scandinavian-American Bank, 122 Wash.
150, 210 Pac. 499 (1922). Also where the receiver collects the bailed item.
State v. Farmers & Mechanics State Bank, 278 Pac. 520 (Mont. 1929)
(evidence of identification seems inadequate in this case).
Tr Supra note 19.
72 See cases cited infra note 74; Walker v. First State Bank, 278 Pac.
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This is no more than saying that if he has a lien on the whole
it extends to every part. So long as the combined fund is not
reduced to an amount below the amount of the claimant's con-
tribution his preference will bring him out whole.13  The fiction
utilized in the KwtchbuU case that the "trustee" will be con-
sidered to have withdrawn his own funds first is peculiarly
demonstrable as a fiction in the case of a bank because the minds
of officers and tellers never advert to the matter of ownership
of the money which they are paying out; nor are they ever con-
cerned with leaving a balance which will be available to any
particular "cestui."
But plainly, the lien cannot attach to a bank's cash for an
764 (N. M. 1928) (owing to a confusing sti~ulation the court treats the
payment as having been made in cash); see explanation of this case in
Board of Commissioners v. People's Bank, 279 Pac. 60 (N. M. 1925). The
Alabama court rejects the idea that the claimant's cash is in the combined
fund and imposes a requirement of almost positive identification. St. Louis
Brewing Ass'n. v. Austin, 100 Ala. 313, 13 So. 908 (1893); Jones v.
Merchants Bank, 209 Ala. 20, 95 So. 274 (1923) (the fact that cash on
hand at all times exceeded the amount paid to the bank "does not Eervo
the purpose of identification within the purview of the pertinent rule").
In doing so it necessarily throws over the concept of equitable lien on the
combined fund-cash. A demurrer to a petition, alleging that the bank had on
hand at all times, exclusive of deposits subsequently made, a sum in cash
in excess of the proceeds of collection, -was sustained in Smith v. Mont-
gomery, 209 Ala. 100, 102, 95 So. 290, 292 (1923) where the court said:
"The contrary rule, which requires identification and more than tracing
the money into a common fund held by a bank or receiver for a number of
claimants has been followed by our court." (In all' the above cases, the
medium of payment does not appear, but the opinions proceed as if payment
had been made in cash). But a bill, averring that the cash taken over
by the receiver "included the sum of $1,800" collected for petitioner was,
of course, held good upon demurrer. Hanover National Bank v. Thomas,
217 Ala. 494, 117 So. 42 (1928). On the tracing point, cf. Patek v. Pate,
166 Mich. 446, 131 N. W. 1101 (1911).
73 In some cases, particularly the older ones, where the medium in which
payment was made does not appear, the courts have proceeded upon the
assumption that cash was collected and have thereafter examined the con-
dition of the cash account in order to decide the question of a right to a
preference. First National Bank of Montgomery v. Armstrong, 36 Fed. 59
(C. C. S. D. Ohio 1888) (amount 6f collection was deducted from statement
of cash on balance sheet in order to balance day's business); Boone County
National Bank v. Latimer, supra note 53 (proceeds received went into the
"cash assets" of the bank); In re Johnson, 103 Lich. 109, 61 N. W. 352
(1894) (receiver's answer alleged the collection proceeds were mingled
with the bank's own currency in vaults); McDonald v. American Bank &
Trust Co., 79 Mont. 233, 255 Pac. 733 (1927); State v. Banking Corp.,
77 Mont. 134, 251 Pac. 151 (1926); Commercial National Bank v. Davis,
115 N. C. 226, 20 S. E. 370 (1894)'; Merchants National Bank v. Davis, 115
N. C. 233, 20 S. E. 371 (1894); Piano Mfg. Co. v. Auld, aupra note 53;
Schimke v. Smith, 50 S. D. 625, 211 N. W. 461 (1926) ; Continental National
Bank v. Weems, 69 Tex. 489, 6 S. W. 802 (1888).
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amount greater than the lowest cash balance in such a mingled
fund from the time at mingling until a claim is made or the
bank passes to the receiver.7 4  Thus, if the mingled funds total
$10,000, of which $2,000 is attributable to the plaintiff's collec-
tion proceeds, and the cash is subsequently reduced by withdraw-
als to $1,000, the lien can attach only to the $1,000 balance.
Subsequent additions to the $1,000 arising from deposits or
other banking operations will not be subjected to the claim of
plaintiff,5 because these additions are in no sense the product
of plaintiff's money, nor do they bear any relation to it. If
the bank thereafter becomes insolvent with $2,500 in cash on
hand, the preference will be limited to $1,000. The lien may
attach to the entire sum of $2,500 but it attaches only to the
extent of $1,000 because a fund ($1,000), upon which there was
a lien limited to $1,000, has been mingled with $1,500 of the
bank's own moneys. The subsequent admixture cannot increase
the effect of the lien as to that particular fund.70 Where the
matter has not been urged upon them, and no facts have ap-
peared in evidence as to the cash balance in the interim, some
courts have, apparently inadvertently, ignored that phase of the
tracing process and assumed that the balance of cash on hand
at the closing of the bank was the lowest balance subsequent to
the date of the collection.7
In applying the rule that the preference will be limited to
the smallest amount of cash on hand in the interim, it is apparent
to anyone with the slightest familiarity with the conduct of
banking operations that a determination of the smallest amount
can never be more than an approximation. In general, the only
74 Boone County National Bank v. Latimer, supra note 53; Woodhouso
v. Crandall, supra note 53; Skinner .v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993
(1928) ; Leach v. Farmers Trust & Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 1348, 217 N. W.
445 (1928); Shields v. Thomas, 71 Miss. 260, 14 So. 84 (1893); State
v. Banking Corp., supra note 53; State v. Bank of Commerce, supra note 58;
Arnot v. Bingham, 55 Hun 553 (N. Y. 1890) (same, plus discounted note
purchased with part of cash).
75 Board of CommissiOners v. Strawn, 157 Fed. 49 (C. C. A. 6th, 1907);
Covey v. Cannon, 104 Ark. 550, 149 S. W. 514 (1912); cf. American Can
Co. v. Williams, supra note 53; Powell v. Missouri Mining Co., 99 Ark.
553, 139 S. W. 299 (1911).
76 See cases cited supra note 75.
77 Plano Mfg. Co. v. Auld, supra note 53; Hunt v. Townsend, 26 S. W.
310 (Tex. 1894); Board of Fire Commissioners v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich.
655, 78 N. W. 893 (1899) (deposits); Woodhouse v. Crandall, supra note
53 (special deposit); State v. Bank of Commerce, 61 Neb. 181, 85 N. W.
43 (1901); Wallace v. Stone, 107 Mich. 190, 65 N. W. 113 (1895). The
presumption that cash on hand at closing-was derived from collection pro-
ceeds when-the contrary was not shown has been allowed. State v. Bank
of Commerce, supra note 53; Murray v. North Liberty Savings Bank, 196
Iowa 729, 195 N. W. 354 (1923).
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data available will be the bank's own statement of cash. The
figure therein contained will represent the amount of cash on
hand at the close of each day's business. Determination of the
lowest amount to which cash fell or of the highest total it
reached between the opening for business on any day and the
conclusion of the operating day is impossible, 8 since withdrawals
are constantly being made and deposits received; the total on
hand is counted only at intervals and in most cases not until
the close of the day's business. The amount entered in the bank's
daily statement must necessarily be taken as the only data
available on the question of the cash balance on any particular
day.
The term "cash" is often used in a conveniently ambiguous
-manner which sometimes leads to loose.judicial thinking. Thus
the term "cash with correspondents" or "cash with other banks"
-has apparently been treated as literally true upon some occasions;
.- the cash fund of a bank has been conceived as including not
only cash on hand in the bank but also the "cash" on deposit in
other banks. Consequently, if the proceeds of a collection item
have been traced into the cash of a bank, the lien has been
presumed to attach to the entire "cash fund!' as last described.P
But the balance standing to the credit of a bank with a corres-
pondent, by the most elementary learning, can have no connec-
tion with the specie and currency in the bank's vaults, unless
the latter has actually been forwarded to the correspondent for
credit. The balance with a correspondent is generally built up
by the deposit of commercial paper, by borrowing and by the
discount of bills receivable. The assimilation of this balance
(which of course is not cash, but merely represents a debt) to
cash on hand is entirely unwarranted for purposes of tracing.
In People v. Iuka State Bank,c collection was made in a check
on the -collecting bank, which would by the usual rule be con-
sidered equivalent to a payment in cash; thereafter on two dif-
ferent days the cash on hand was less than the amount of the
-collection. The Illinois Appellate court surmounted that difficulty
by adding together the amount of cash on hand each day and
the credits with correspondents to ascertain each day's cash
total, and on the latter basis accorded the claimant preferential
treatment. The reverse of this transaction is illustrated by
78 Failure of the bank sometimes impinges so closely upon the receipt of
-cash that no conclusion other than that the cash is still in the bank is
reasonable. Union State Bank v. People's State Bank, Lpra note 34.
79 State v. Bank of Commerce, supra note 77; People v. Iuka State Bank,
229 Ill. App. 4 (1923). In the first case, there might have been some reason
for considering that it was possible to trace into one bank account, but
assuredly not into all. Cf. Schimke v. Smith, supra note 73.
80 Supra note 79.
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People v. Auburn State Bank,81 where payment was received
by A bank in checks on B bank; the collector deposited the
checks in C bank. In determining the fund from which claim-
ant's claim for a preference could be paid, the court added to
the credit on the books of C the amount of cash on hand in A's
vaults; preference was decreed despite the fact that for three
days prior to the failure of A the balance with C was less than
the amount of the collection. By the simplest of all tracing
technique, the proceeds of claimant's items had gone into the
balance on the books of C and had (so far as the facts show)
not the slightest connection with the cash in A's vaults.a2 Most.
courts are astute enough to realize that in such a situation col-
lection proceeds cannot be traced into both assets.83
Another question arises where the claimant can trace the with-
drawals of cash into securities held by the bank at the time of
failure. In re Oatway 84 is the analogue of that situation; there
withdrawals were made by a trustee from the combined bank
account; here withdrawals are made by the bank itself from the
combined cash on hand upon which the court impresses a trust
or equitable lien. Pursuing the same general reasoning as that
later to be applied in the Oatway case, some American courts had
already decided that the claimant could follow the withdrawals
into the securities and secure a preference with relation to.
81215 IlL App. 133 (1919). Cf. Macy v. Roedenbeck, 227 Fed. 346 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1915).
82 The most recent example of this lack of perception is found in Lane
v. First National Bank of Vale, 281 Pac. 172, 283 Pac. 17 (Ore. 1929).
Compare with this the reasoning in Blythe v. Kujawa, supra note 62,
where the receiver admitted that the bank received credit on the books of
the correspondent for the item therein question and that the same thereby
immediately became a part of the bank's assets. "Whether the bank thbre-
after paid out obligations direct over its counter at home or through its
Chicago correspondent would not seem important. Whether a man uses his
left or his right hand in paying an obligation does not matter. We are
unable to make any distinction between the cash funds kept by this bank
in its own vault and in.the vault of its Chicago correspondent. The money
in either place was a part of the cash holdings of the bank as a whole. And,
having at all times since the receipt of this fund had on hand and turned
over to the receiver cash more than sufficient to pay this trust fund, neither
the receiver nor the general creditors have cause for complaint." 175
Minn. at 95, 220 N. W. at 171. Cash turned over to receiver was $13,000;
balance with correspondent was $353; a preferred claim for $4,500 was
allowed.
83 See cases cited supra novt 74 and infra note 95; Board of Commission-
ers v. Strawn, supra note 75; Walker v. First State Bank, 27& Pac. 764
(N. M. 1928); Gering v. Buerstetta, supra note 25; Andrew v. Hamilton
Co. State Bank, 223 N. W. 176 (Iowa, 1929) (draft for $970 collected in
currency and checks; amount of neither shown; held, no tracing into
bank's cash).
84 Supra nofo 10.
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them3 s5 Since the lien is on the entire mingled fund, as soon as
mingling occurs the lienor can follow all parts of that fund
through all their mutations until an innocent purchaser inter-
venes or until his whole claim is satisfied.
Checks Drum on CoUecting Bmzlh. Payment of collections by
checks drawn on the collecting bank have presented some of the
most controversial questions in the whole field of tracing. Start-
ing with the proposition that before a preference can be granted
there must be a res of some sort in respect to which a fiduciary
relation can be established, the first inquiry in any case must
direct itself to the question of the existence of such a res. This
requirement is sometimes expressed by saying that there must
be an "augmentation of assets" of the collecting bank in the
first instance; if, in making a collection, there is nothing added
to the estate of the bank, there is ndthing to which a "trust"
-an properly be attached. Hence, when the bank makes collec-
-ion by taking a check drawn by a customer on his account with
;he bank, the first question is: How have the assets of the
bank been increased? An obvious answer is that they have not;
by accepting the depositor's check, no tangible res, no chose
in action, has been added to what the bank already possessed.
The check represents merely a diminution of the total of the
bank's liabilities to the extent of the amount for which the check
is drawn. For the purposes of establishing a trust and decree-
ing a lien on specific property, a decrease of liabilities is not an
increase of assets. The federal courts uniformly adhere to the
proposition that receipt of a check drawn on the collecting bank
ddes not constitute an increase of assets and accordingly deny
-that a trust is raised in respect to any specific property in the
insolvent bank's estate; "a a preference therefore cannot be
-granted in such a case. A small number of state courts follow
the same rule.s7
8 Arnot v. Bingham, supra note 74; City of Lincoln v. Morrison, 64 Neb.
-822, 90 N. W. 905 (1902); cf. Spokane v. First National Bank, 68 Fed.
979 (C. C. A. 9th, (1895).
"' Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Clayton, 56 Fed. 759 (C. C. A. 5th,
1893);-American Can Co. v. Williams, supra note 53; Empire State Surety
,Co. v. Carroll County, 194 Fed. 593 (C. C. A. 8th, 1912), with which of.
Mechanics & Metals National Bank v. Buchanan, 12 F. (2d) 891 (C. C. A.
8th, 1926); Sparks Co. v. Americus National Bank, 230 Fed. 738 (S. D.
Ga. 1916); Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank, supra
note 53; Larabee Flour Mills Co. v. National Bank, 13 F. (2d) 330 (C. C.
A. 8th, 1926); Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour Co., 26 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A.
8th, 1928); Burnes National Bank v. Spurway, 28 F. (2d) 40 (S. D. Iowa
1928); Steele Briggs Seed Co. v. Spurway, supra note 53. See the confused
attempt to obviate this rule by a resort to the equitable assignment doc-
trine in Early & Daniel Co. v. Pearson, 36 F. (2d) 732 (C. C. A. 5th, 1929).
7 People v. Merchants & Mechanics Bank, 78 N. Y. 269 (1879) ; cf. People
v. Merchants Bank, 92 Hun 159 (N. Y. 1895); HecherJones-Jewell Mill-
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Other courts disregard the mere form of the transaction and
treat payment by check as equivalent to payment in cash. 8 The
grounds for such a treatment are stated in this general manner:
The exchange of the check for the collection item is simply a
short cut for a more laborious and circuitous process which in-
volves presentment of the check at the paying teller's window,
withdrawal of the cash, and then redelivery of the cash at the
collection window in payment of the collection item; if the cir-
cuitous process were followed, the assets of the bank would un-
doubtedly be increased by the amount of the cash payment; it
is illogical to accord a different effect to one method of payment
than to the other.8 9 Hence if the amount of cash on hand in
the bank is sufficient to cover the check, payment by check will
be treated as if payment had been effected in cash, a not unrea-
sonable conclusion. The claimant is accordingly aided at this
point by the adoption of another fiction, namely, that the payor
cashed his check and paid the cash back into the bank for the
item. Having once adopted and applied the fiction, the sub-
sequent tracing of the collection proceeds takes the course
described for tracing the proceeds of a cash payment.
Clea rings. A parallel problem is involved in case collection
is effected by means of bank clearings. If X bank forwards to A
bank checks and other items payable by B bank and A proceeds
to collect X's items by exchanging the latter for checks held by
B and drawn on A, how can X trace the proceeds of its paper?
In effect, B has paid for such paper iii checks drawn on A. The
ing Co. v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co., supra note 35; Freiberg v. Stoddart,
supra note 57; Zimmerli v. Northern Bank & Trust Co., 111 Wash. 624,
191 Pac. 788 (1920).
88 State National Bank v. First National Bank, 124 Ark. 531, 187 S. W.
673 (1916); United States National Bank v. Glanton, supra note 42;
Skinner v. Porter, 45 Idaho 530, 263 Pac. 993 (1928); Messenger v. Carroll
Bank, 193 Iowa 608, 187 N. W. 545 (1922); Leach v. Farmers Savings
Bank, 204 Iowa 1083, 216 N. W. 748 (1927); Leach v. Farmers
Trust & Savings Bank, 204 Iowa 1343, 217 N. W. 445 (1928); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hanover State Bank, 109 Kan. 772, 204 Pac. 992
(1922); Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Millspaugh, supra note 30 (checks for-
warded directly to drawee); Hawaiian Pineapple Co. v. Browne, supra note
30; Sinclair Refining Co. v. Tierney, supra note 42; Kansas Flour Mills Co.
v. New State Bank, 124 Okla. 185, 256 Pac. 43 (1926); First State Bank
v. O'Bannon, supra note 30; Mothersead v. Excello Feed Milling Co., 131
Okla. 100, 267 Pac. 833 (1928) ; Federal Reserve Bank v. Peters, supra note
30. Preference is denied, however, if the account of the drawer of the check
is overdrawn when the check is given. Andrew v. Farmers' State Bank, 20a
Iowa 1014, 212 N. W. 124 (1927).89 "Such a formality [first withdrawing cash and then paying it back
into the bank], ordinarily so useless, so contrary to banking custom, would
have been entirely superfluous. A court of equity, in the endeavor to
determine conflicting rights, is not naturally impressed with a distinction so
unsubstantial." Sinclair Refining Co, v. Tierney, supra note 42, at 793.
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identity of this situation with that in which an individual pays
by his check on A would be plain if the clearings between the
two banks exactly balanced. In that event, one could say that
A had collected X's paper by a simple reduction of its own in-
debtedness, viz., the amount of the checks drawn on A, and that
there had been no increase in A's assets upon which a trust
could be imposed. Or, one could indulge in the fiction that B
had presented its checks to A, received the cash therefor, and
then repaid the same to A in exchange for X's items drawn on
B. The first result could well be achieved by application of the
federal rule that there had been no augmentation of assets, pay-
ment having been effected through the medium of checks drawn
on the collecting bank. The Kansas court chose to apply the
other theory and permitted X to trace the proceeds of its items
into A's cash.9° In this case the balance of clearings was against
A, and hence A had actually paid to B its draft for the difference,
in addition to turning over the checks drawn on B. This fact
did not affect the result, however, once the fiction had been ap-
plied. B was presumed to have paid A the amount of X's checks
in cash, and so long as the cash on hand in A continued to equal
or exceed the amount of X's items, X had a lien on such fund.
But what is the technique of tracing in case the balance is in
favor of A? To illustrate: A presented to B items totalling
$3,224, in which was included X's paper to the amount of $2,923.
B paid these clearings with checks drawn on A for $2,338, with
checks on R bank (for which A acted as clearing agent) for
$353 and a draft on Z for $533. The draft qn Z was deposited
t6 the credit of A's account with a correspondent and the balance
in that account never thereafter fell below $533. The checks on
R were charged to R and constituted a valid claim against that
bank. Cash in A at all times exceeded $3,000. The court took
the view that X's funds were never mingled with the funds in
A bank, that its money was plainly traced in part to the pay-
ment of A's debts (i.e., checks drawn on A), and that there was
90 Kansas State Bank v. First State Bank, 62 Ran. 788, 64 Pac. 634
(1901). Contra: Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage District, supra note 53; First
National Bank v. Williams, supra note 35; Smith Reduction Corp. v. Wil-
liams, supra note 35; Farmers National Bank v. Pribble, 15 F. (2d) 175
(C. C. A. 8th, 1926); Rorebeck v. Benedict Flour Co., supra note 86; Burnes
National Bank v. Spurway, supra note 86; Steele Briggs Seed Co. v. Spur-
way, supra note 53; Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, supra note 47;
Leach v. City-Commercial Savings Bank, 207 Iowa 1254, 219 N. W. 496
(1928); Leach v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 211 N. W. 506 (Iowa 1926);
Northwestern National Bank v. James Valley Bank, supra note 53; Birch
v. International State Bank, 50 S. D. 60, 208 N. W. 167 (1926). The same
result as in the Kansas case was reached in Bauck v. Veigel, 225 N. W. 916
(Minn. 1929), where the balance of clearings was in favor of A. It was
held that the claimant was entitled to trace the amount of its collection
nto A's cash, the checks received from B being considered as the equivalent
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no connection between the cash in A and the paper of X.11 This
amounted to an adoption of the federal rule regarding augmenta-
tion. But the court held that X's proceeds were distinctly traced
into A's account with its correspondent where the $533 draft
was deposited and into whatever sum the receiver should be able
to recover from R on the claim.
In People's National Bank v. Moore9 2 the balance of clearings
in favor of A exceeded the amount of X's items and was paid by
a draft on B's correspondent. X was held "entitled to impress
a trust upon" the draft and its proceeds for the amount of his
checks. 93 The cash on hand in A at the time of failure is not
considered; the court treats the total of A's clearings as a mingled
fund and raises the hackneyed presumption that the trustee "did
that which was lawful, and therefor made his payments out of
his own portion of the fund." Therefore, "applying the principle
of these cases, it must be presumed, in the absence of evidence to
the contrary, that the People's National Bank (A) applied to its
debts due to the Stockman's Bank (B) the obligations belonging
to the People's National Bank, and received the draft as repre-
senting, in part, the amount of plaintiff's checks." 01 As the
federal rule precludes the use of the fiction that payment by
check is equivalent to payment in cash, it is plain that a prefer-
ence would have to be denied unless it were possible to prove that
the proceeds of the plaintiff's checks were traceable into some
other asset which came into the receiver's hands. In this in-
stance the plaintiff chose the draft of B as that asset. Is it
possible to show, with or without the aid of the presumptions
which have been heretofore discussed, that the proceeds of X's
,checks are capable of being traced into the draft?
In the first place, it is well to note that there is no mingled
of cash. In addition the claimant received the cash with which B had paid
-A for the balance of clearings running against B.
91 Warren Paving Co. v. Dunn, 8 App. Div. 205, 40 N. Y. Supp. 209
t(3d Dep't 1896).
92 25 F. (2d) 599 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928).
93Accord: Nyssa-Arcadia Drainage District v. First National Bank,
-supra note 53; cf. Dickson v. First National Bank, oupra note 53; Leach
v. Iowa State Savings Bank, supra note 47; Leach v. City-Commercial Sav-
ings Bank, supra note 90. In People's State Bank v. Burlington State
Bank, 277 Pac. 39 (Kan. 1929), claimant's item drawn on B was for $4000,
the balance of clearings in favor of A was $4580, and the draft given by B
in payment therefor was distinctly traceable. Preference was granted for
$4000 although nothing appears in the opinion as to what items other than
the $4000 one were included in A's clearings on B.
94 Without considering the problem of tracing into the draft, the Iowa
,court denies a preference if there is no evidence of the disposition of the
draft; before a preference can be allowed, it must be found in the hands of
the collecting bank or traced into cash or a bank deposit. Leach v. City-
,Commercial Savings Bank, supra note 90.
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fund in this case. When X's checks were bundled together with
checks belonging to A fur presentment for payment, there vlas
no mingled fund; X's checks were capable of positive identifica-
tion; all that occurred up to the time that the checks on B were
paid was that a number of separate and easily distinguishable
pieces of paper were bundled together under one rubber band;
the resultant was not a "confused mass" of mingled funds. Ac-
cordingly A did not exchange a mingled fund (upon which X had
a lien) for a certain number of checks on itself plus B's draft.
Nor was the product of the use of X's checks and A's checks a
single distinct'piece of property. The detailed result of what oc-
curred was that a certain distinct part of A's property plus a
certain distinct part of X's property was exchanged to B for a
reduction of A's general indebtedness plus a draft on B's cor-
respondent. It is impossible to say what checks were used to
buy B's draft and what were devoted to the reduction of A's
indebtedness. The presumption that first withdrawals will be
attributed to the funds of the trustee does not apply, because
first, there is no mingled fund, and second, there was only one
withdrawal (if that term is apt). It is plain that the court is
either applying with steadfastness a general presumption that
the trustee was honest and paid its indebtedness with its own
checks, or is creating a new presumption which must be described
somewhat like this: A received the total of its clearings in
cash; on that fund X had a lien because the total cash fund in-
cluded the payment for X's checks; thereafter A used that min-
gled fund for the purpose, inter alia, of buyiif B's draft on B's
correspondent; since B had a lien on the mingled fund, it will
have a lien on the draft and the proceeds of the draft. The
first presumption, i.e., the presumption of honesty, differs in
its application from that usually stated in that it is not con-
cerned. with a mingled fund. It amounts to this: if it is known
that a trustee has bought a certain bit of property either out
of trust funds or out of his own funds, but it is not known
definitely from which, it must be presumed that he purchased
it from the trust funds if the cestui chooses to claim it as the
proceeds or product of trust funds, a proposition that is logically
insupportable in the absence'of evidence that the trustee's per-
sonal funds and the trust funds were mingled prior to purchase.
The other possible presumption set out cannot well be adopted
in the federal courts because it would do violence to the course
of decision on the effect of payment by check. On the whole,
the most that can be said is that A's indebtedness was reduced
by the combined use of X's checks and A's checks, and that the
draft on B was purchased by the combined use of the same
checks, and that it is impossible to attribute one to the other
even by the employment of the usual presumptions which cling
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to "equitable lien." However, the "mingling" of the checks in
clearing is probably too nearly identical with a mingling of
cash to expect that any distinction will be taken between them;
a distinction in treatment of claimants on such a basis certainly
would not appeal to a layman, nor indeed to courts. But it is
clear that without making the combined use of checks the equiva-
lent of the mingling of cash all possibility of tracing disappears.
Other Commercial Paper. Where the collecting bank accepts
in payment of commercial paper placed with it for collection the
check of the payor drawn on another bank or a bank draft not
drawn upon itself further tracing questions arise. Many of
these, which would be simple of solution to a banker, often con-
fuse the courts. If the drawee of the check or draft so received
is located in the same city or town, the instrument may be
traced through the local clearing process until an exchange of
checks is completed; thereafter, the problems previously dis-
cussed will present themselves. If the drawee of the instrument
is located elsewhere, the collector will usually proceed to secure
payment in one of the three following ways:
(1) Forward the payment item to a correspondent for
credit.
(2) Forward the payment item directly to the drawee for
remittance.
(3) Forward the payment item to someone other than the
drawee for collection and remittance.
It is self-evident that if any one of these three methods is fol-
lowed there can'be no tracing into the first collecting bank's
cash on hand. In using the first method the draft is converted
into a credit on the books of the correspondent and the situation
thereafter is the simple one of tracing the trust funds into
(and out of) the bank account 6f the trustee. The owner of the
original item can impress a "trust" on the account of the col-
lector with the correspondent, 5 but the same will be subject
to the usual rules regarding tracing and withdrawals. The
claimant will not be preferred to an amount in excess of the
lowest balance in the collecting bank's account09 Therefore if
that account is ever overdrawn between the day of the deposit
and the time when the collecting bank closes, all claim of con-
structive trust or equitable lien vanishes,DT and the claimant will
9'5 Commercial National Bank v. Armstrong, 148 U. S. 50, 13 Sup. Ct.
533 (1893); Titlow v. McCormick, 236 Fed. 209 (C. C. A. 9th, 1916);
Hutchinson v. National Bank of Commerce, 145 Ala. 196, 41 So. 143 (1906);
Hall v. Beymer, 22 Colo. App. 271, 125 Pac. 561 (1912); State v. Farmers'
State Bank, 54 Mont. 515, 172 Pac. 130 (1918); Pennington v. Third
National Bank, 114 Va. 674, 77 S. E. 455 (1913); Foster v. Rincker, 4
Wyo. 484, 35 Pac. 470 (1894) ; cf. Colteaux v. First Trust & Savings Bank,
52 S. D. 443, 218 N. W. 151 (1928); Kleve v. State, 227 N. W. 218 (N. D.
1929). See Board of Commissioners v. People's Bank, smpra note 72, at 65.
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not be *entitled to a preference out of other balances or funds,
"as they do not appear to have been derived in any measure from
the proceeds" of the instrument.98 If the second or third method
is followed, the drawee or correspondent will in the usual course
remit to the collecting bank in its draft and thereafter the col-
lecting bank must again embark upon one of the three enumerated
processes in order to collect the payment draft. If the original
collecting bank fails while the payment draft is in transit, the
collection proceeds are of course traced into that draft.
PRESUMPTION OF HONESTY
The unnecessary injection "" of a presumption of honesty into
the cases of Pennell v. Deffel a°° and Knatcldtbdl v. Hal-
left "' in order to justify the results there achieved has not al-
ways led to happy results in other cases where there has been
a strict adherence to the implications of a literal presumption of
honesty. Taking at face value the usual statement that in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, the court will presume the
trustee intended to observe his trust and leave the trust funds
intact, it has sometimes been thought that the converse was
necessarily true, namely, that if it were shown that the trustee
acted without regard to his trust or in violation thereof, it
could not reasonably be supposed that he intended to withdraw
- Titlow v. McCormick, supra note 95; State v. Farmers' State Bank,
supra note 95; Gering v. Buerstetta, supra note 25, cf. Anadarko Cotton
Oil Co. v. Litteer, supra note 53; State Bank of Winfield v. Alva Security
Bank, 232 Fed. 847 (C. C. A. 8th, 1916); American Can Co. v. Williams,
mupra note 53; Miller's Appeal, 218 Pa. 50, 66 Atl. 995 (1907). But cf.
Macy v. Roedenbeck, supra note 81. As to tracing see Shaw v. ,IcCrd,
18 S. W. (2d) 200 (Tex. Civ. App., 1929).
- Titlow v. McCormick, supra note 95; Farmers State Bank v. Smith,
supra note 53; Salem Elevator Works v. Commissioner of Banks, cupra
note 53; Groff v. City Sbvings Fund & Trust Co., 46 Pa. Super. Ct. 423
(1911) (trust res deposited with correspondent).
98 State v. Farmers State Bank, supra note 95. See also note 94. If the
correspondent exercises a power to charge off the balance and apply the
same on the indebtedness of the collecting bank to it, such action, of course,
precludes granting of a preference. City Bank v. Blackmore, 75 Fed. 771
(C. C. A. 6th, 1896); Dickson v. First National Bank, supra note 53;
Leach v. Iowa State Savings Bank, supra note 47; Shaw v. Lamar County,
12 S. W. (2d) 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928). Collateral released by such
application, however, is charged with the lien. Gering v. Buerstetta, mipra
note 25, at 630.
99 Unnecessary, in that there was precedent for attaining a lilce result
without resorting to any such presumption. Pinkett v*. Wright, supra note 20.
1)0 Supra note 16.
101 Supra note 19.
102 Baggallay, L. J., even gave expression to such a view in Knatchbull
v. Hallett, supra note 22.
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his own funds and leave those equitably belonging to the cestui,
and, therefore, that tracing into the balance of a mingled account
must fail.10 2 Thus, where the bank obviously acted in flagrant
disregard of the duty which it owed the co-owner of a collection
item the Washington court declined to presume honesty and its
concomitant-intention to withdraw (expend) first the funds
belonging to the bank and leave intact those of the co-owner.'"
In Philadelphia National Bank v. Dowd 20 4 the court Well pointed
out the improbability that misappropriated funds remained in a
bank's cash although the cash fund never fell below the amount
of the former. Any fiction of intention is rebutted by fact;
"the officers of the bank had no intent to make any difference
between the money collected for their correspondents and that
passed over the counters of the bank by depositors." Having
effectively eliminated any idea of intent to preserve the collection
proceeds, obviously the claimant cannot point out the particular
currency received for his collection; so tracing fails and a
preference is denied.
But today the presumption of honesty is recognized as a fic-
tion, a device to explain a result. When its use will obtain
preferential treatment for a claimant he will utilize it; but when
its implications would deny him a favored position he gets closer
to the actualities of the situation and proceeds to trace his funds,
ignoring, in so far as tracing is concerned, the. fact that the
trustee was dishonest. As the cases of Arnot v. Bingham, 0
City of Lincon v. Morrismn,1°0 and In re Oatway 2- indicate,
the intent of the trustee is immaterial; he may even intend to
despoil the trust estate, but that fact will not even retard the
tracing process and the award of a preference. If it has any
effect, it will, in most cases, aid the claimant. In the case of
In re A. 0. Brown & Co., 08 Hand, J., clearly discerned "equitable
lien" camouflaged by the screen labelled "presumption of
honesty" and brought it out into the open in this passage:
203 Rugger v. Hammond, 95 Wash. 85, 163 Pac. 408 (1917). This case is
illustrative of the lack of knowledge of banking methods so frequently
exhibited in judicial decisions. Here the court in investigating what became
of collection proceeds wanders widely, devotes most of its attention to the
checks drawn against the account of the person who was credited with the
proceeds, and wonders what became of the balance in that account, forget-
ting the proceeds entirely. More recent opinions of the Supreme Court
of Washington in banking litigation are characterized by a highly enlight-
ened understanding of banking operations and the methods followed. Cf.
Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869 (1920);
Ryer Grain Co. v. American Security Bank, supra note 39.
104 38 Fed. 172 (C. C. E. D. N. C. 1889).
'o5 Supra note 74.
206 Pupra note 85.
107 Supra note 10.
08 189 Fed. 432 (S. D. N. Y. 1911).
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"Upon that chose in action (the mingled bank account] the
beneficiary has a lien, if he wishes to assert it, equal to the sum
of money which his property has contributed to it. So in this
case the claimants may elect to retain a lien upon the total de-
posit after the first withdrawal. This is the effect of the case
of Knatchbull v. Hallett. . a case which has been very fre-
quently cited and the decision of which has been followed many
times. This is sometimes stated as a presumption of the trustee's
intent, but that is a fiction." '0 9
It would be well if the presumption of honesty should go the
way of all outworn machinery; its use is no longer necessary and
persistence in its enunciation may only retard proper analysis
of the fact situation to which it is applied. It has well served its
purpose, but now that the day of its usefulness is passed it should
be consigned to the realm of the forgotten.
CONCLUSION
Tracing the proceeds of a collection item should be a relatively
simple matter. The confusion which the courts have frequently
made of cases involving tracing must be attributed in the main
to two causes: first, lack of knowledge of banking technique on
the part of the courts, and second, similar lack of knowledge and
inadequate preparation of cases by counsel. An attempt to trace
collection proceeds into cash on hand when payment has been
made by check on a distant bank is as inexcusable as failure to
offer evidence of cash on hand when payment has been made by
a check on the collecting bank. Addition Qf credits with cor-
respondents and cash on hand in order to determine the fund
from which a preference can be paid is simply ridiculous, if
tracing means anything at all. The accounting problems in-
volved in tracing are slight, and any banker could readily de-
termine whether or not collection proceeds were identifiable in
their original or substituted form if the matter were presented
to him for solution.
Lack of understanding on the part of courts and the legal
profession has no doubt frequently resulted in disgust at the
whole requirement of tracing and has expressed itself in a desire
for some simple method of adjusting preferred claims and elimi-
nating the technicalities, which are presumed to be very involved.
Some recent legislation seems to have been based upon a desire
to arrive at a simple, clear-cut definition of the positions of the
various parties without reference to the justice of the results
obtained. Outstanding examples are found in North Carolina 10
209 Ibid. 434.
110 N. C. CODE (1927) c. 14, § 218. Cf. Whitaker Co. v. Whitten, 197 N.
C. 251, 148 S. E. 239 (1929).
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and Georgia "I' where legislation eliminates the details of tracing
collection proceeds by granting to the owner of a collected but un-
remitted collection a lien upon all the assets of the collecting
bank, dating from the time of collection.112 Such legislation,
framed without regard to the equities of the situation, is
more or less a throw-back to the doctrine of McLeod v. Evans.113
In attempting to avoid the presumed, but non-existent, difficulties
involved in the tracing process, it goes to the other extreme and
provides a harsh penalty for the general creditors of an insolvent
bank in order to favor "trust" creditors who cannot point to any
res and say, "This was produced by the use of my money."
The considerations involved in seeking preferential payments
have been discussed largely as if the whole matter were a prob-
lem of property. And it cannot be doubted that such it essen-
tially is. But it is not intended to suggest here that some other
more economical basis might not be found for dealing with the
relations arising out of the transactions herein detailed. Some
statutory rules might be devised which would simplify the pro-
cedure and yet retain all the essential requirements of identifica-
tion. More economical administration in the liquidation of in-
solvent banks might be attained, at least in some degree, by the
elimination of the litigation that always attends a receiver as a
result of the doubtful status of collection items. But it is be-
lieved that the statutes cited go too far in throwing overboard
the entire principle of identification. And it is further believed
that the law on the subject is, in many jurisdictions, becoming
well enough defined not to require a rejection of that principle in
order to avoid lifigation.
121 GA. ANN. CODE (Michie Supp. 1928) § 2366 (70).
112 Arkansas has attempted to give statutory form to the usual rules
regarding the tracing of collection proceeds. ARK. DiG. STAT. (Supp. 1927)
§ 716.
2,3 Supra note 46.
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